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In survival analysis, regression models are used to understand the eects of explanatory variables (e.g., age, sex, weight, etc.) to
the survival probability. However, for sensitive survival data such as medical data, there are serious concerns about the privacy of
individuals in the data set when medical data is used to t the regression models. e closest work addressing such privacy concerns
is the work on Cox regression which linearly projects the original data to a lower dimensional space. However, the weakness of
this approach is that there is no formal privacy guarantee for such projection. In this work, we aim to propose solutions for the
regression problem in survival analysis with the protection of dierential privacy which is a golden standard of privacy protection in
data privacy research. To this end, we extend the Output Perturbation and Objective Perturbation approaches which are originally
proposed to protect dierential privacy for the Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) problems. In addition, we also propose a novel
sampling approach based on the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to practically guarantee dierential privacy with beer
accuracy. We show that our proposed approaches achieve good accuracy as compared to the non-private results while guaranteeing
dierential privacy for individuals in the private data set.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Survival analysis studies and models probability of failure of time-related processes (e.g., time to death of HIV patients,
time to divorce of married couples, time to graduation of Ph.D. students, etc.). Two important concepts in survival
analysis are (1) the hazard rate function h(t ) which is the probability of failure (death) at time t , and (2) the survival
function S(t ) which is the probability of survival to time t . An example of survival data set is the electronic health
records (EHRs) which have been widely used and collected at large scale in modern hospitals (Blumenthal and Tavenner
2010; DesRoches et al. 2008; Jha et al. 2009). ese health records are very useful for ing the regression models to
assist doctors in the medical decision processes for treatment, diagnosis, etc. In general, regression models are used to
analyze the eects of explanatory variables (e.g., age, sex, weight, etc.) to the survival probability of patients. However,
these models may also have serious problems of breaching patient’s privacy as there is no guarantee that these models
do not leak any personal information of individual patients in the data set.
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In this work, we focus on the privacy problems of regression models used in survival analysis. We consider the
seing in which privacy-preserving algorithms use data in the private data set to t a survival regression model. e
model is then published and available to the public for the benets of society. erefore, in this seing, the adversaries
are assumed to know the output model, i.e., the parameters of the regression model. e goal is to design algorithms
that can t the survival regression model to the data set with high accuracy while guaranteeing that the adversaries
cannot learn much information about the individuals in the data set when knowing the output model.
ere are two dierent kinds of regression models in survival analysis, namely continuous-time models and discrete-
time models. For continuous-time models, time is a continuous variable and failure events can happen at any moment.
Cox regression is a well-known continuous-time model (Andersen and Gill 1982; Cox 1992) which allows estimation
without any assumption on the baseline hazard eects. However, we have to assume the proportional hazard property
(i.e., a unit increase in an explanatory variable will cause a multiplicative eect on the hazard rate). For discrete-time
models (Allison 1982; Cox and Oakes 1984; Muthe´n and Masyn 2005), time is discrete and failure events only happen at
discrete values of time. Discrete-time regression models are beer than Cox regression when dealing with tied events
(i.e., events which have the same value of survival time) and unobserved population heterogeneity (i.e., unobserved
explanatory variables may cause bias to the estimation). Moreover, it does not need the proportional hazard property
assumption as Cox regression does (Hess and Persson 2012).
In this paper, we propose solutions for the problem of guaranteeing discrete-time models not to leak personal
information of the patients. Our proposed approaches guarantee dierential privacy protection, which is the state-of-
the-art privacy-preserving technique in data privacy research. Informally, a dierentially private algorithm guarantees
that two neighboring data sets which are dierent at only one patient’s record are guaranteed to produce two outputs
whose probability densities are very similar. is prevents an adversary from recognizing a data set from the collection
of its neighbors. erefore, an adversary cannot infer the personal information of a particular patient in the data set
even in the case when the adversary knew all the information of all other patients in the data set (if otherwise, then the
adversary can easily distinct two neighboring data sets).
In our solutions, we use the maximum likelihood estimation to transform the estimation problem to the optimization
problem of choosing parameters to maximize the log-likelihood of the observed data set with respect to the discrete-time
model. Coincidentally, our problem has a similar likelihood form as a logistic regression problem. is allows us to use
the Output Perturbation (Out-Pert) and Objective Perturbation (Obj-Pert) proposed by Chaudhuri et al. (Chaudhuri
et al. 2011) for our problem. ese methods were originally proposed to protect dierential privacy for the Empirical
Risk Minimization (ERM) problems which include the logistic regression problem. e Out-Pert approach adds noise
to the optimization solution to protect dierential privacy. e Obj-Pert approach randomly perturbs the objective
function, thereby ensuring the randomness of its optimization solution which can guarantee dierential privacy for
the solution. However, these approaches cannot be applied directly to our problem due to the dierence in the loss
function. Especially, this is due to the fact that our loss function is not a logistic loss function but a sum of logistic loss
functions as the result of the discrete-time models. erefore, we propose generalized extensions of the Out-Pert and
Obj-Pert approaches to cater for our loss function.
A disadvantage of the above perturbation approaches is that for them to work properly they require a non-negligible
regularization term in the objective function which incurs bias to the output model. To tackle this, we propose a
sampling approach which protects dierential privacy by directly sampling parameters from the objective function
without the need of a regularization term to guarantee dierential privacy. Similar ideas on sampling the objective
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functions to provide dierential privacy are also proposed in (Bassily et al. 2014; Kifer et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2015) for
the ERM problems. However, it is required that the loss function has to have a nite maximum value. e previous
works guarantee this property by boxing the output parameters in a nite-volume space (e.g., a sphere). is approach
does not work well when the optimal parameter has a large magnitude. In this work, to guarantee the nite constraint,
we wrap the loss function inside a sanitizer function (i.e., a scaled tanh function) to create a new nite loss function.
We intentionally pick the sanitizer function that can keep the loss function in its original form when the value of the
loss function is small. Meanwhile, the sanitizer function deforms the loss function at large values to make the function
nite. e advantage of this approach is that the sampled parameter can arbitrary large while the objective function is
kept almost the same around the optimal parameter which minimizes the objective function.
In order to sample an output parameter from the posterior distribution, Bassily et al. (Bassily et al. 2014) proposed a
polynomial run-time algorithm to sampling the log-concave objective function but their algorithm is still impractical due
to the high degree of its polynomial run-time complexity. On the other hand, Wang et al. (Wang et al. 2015) proposed
to use a stochastic gradient Nose´-Hoover thermostat algorithm (Ding et al. 2014) to sample the posterior distribution.
In this work, we propose to use Preconditioned Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics (pSGLD) sampling algorithm
(Li et al. 2015) to sample the objective function due to its advantages in sampling multi-dimensional parameters with
dierent scales. It is worth to note that even though the sampling approach gives beer accuracy (as we will see in
Section 6), due to the property of its Markov chain, it cannot sample the objective function exactly. erefore, the
sampling approach does not mathematically guarantee dierential privacy but only guarantees it approximately in
practice.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose two privacy-preserving approaches, namely the Extended Output Perturbation and Extended
Objective Perturbation, for the discrete-time survival regression problem. e proposed approaches guarantee
dierential privacy for the survival regression models. We formally prove these guarantees based on the
denition of dierential privacy.
• We propose a sampling approach to output a random model from its posterior distribution. e proposed
sampling approach is based on pSGLD, which is a particular kind of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method, to eciently sample the random output which guarantees dierential privacy approximately in
practice.
• We show the eectiveness of our proposed approaches on four real survival data sets. In addition, we show that
the results obtained from the discrete-time models are very close to the results obtained from Cox regression.
We also show experimentally the convergence of our proposed sampling approach.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the related work on dierential privacy and
discrete-time survival analysis. Section 3 presents the regression models used in this work. Sections 4 discusses the
proposed approaches of the Extended Output Perturbation and Extended Objective Perturbation along with their
privacy guarantees. Section 5 discusses the proposed sampling approach. Section 6 presents the experimental results
from real data sets. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 RELATEDWORK
Even though it is important to protect privacy in medical data, as far as we know the work of Yu et al. (Yu et al. 2008) is
the only work on privacy protection for Cox regression. eir work considers the seing in which Cox regression is
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executed on a distributed data set over many institutions. ey proposed to project patient’s data to a lower dimensional
space by a linear projection. e projection is satised by an optimization constraint to preserve good properties of the
original data. However, their work is not based on a formal privacy denition such as dierential privacy. Our work on
discrete-time models for survival analysis is the rst to propose a solution for the privacy problem of discrete-time
survival models and also the rst to apply dierential privacy to survival analysis.
2.1 Dierential Privacy
e state-of-the-art technique for the data privacy problem is dierential privacy (Dwork 2009, 2011; Dwork et al. 2014).
Basically, dierential privacy is a promise to individuals in the data set that their information will not inuence much
on the nal published results from the analysis. Dierential privacy is used in many applications such as histogram
publication (Li et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2014), graph analysis (Borgs et al. 2015; Kasiviswanathan et al. 2013; Lu and
Miklau 2014), regression and classication (Bassily et al. 2014; Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2009; Kifer et al. 2012; Wang
et al. 2015), recommender systems (Machanavajjhala et al. 2011; McSherry and Mironov 2009), etc. Here, we give a brief
overview of dierential privacy, interested readers can refer to (Dwork et al. 2014) for a detailed discussion on this
subject.
To formalize the denition of dierential privacy, we rst need to introduce the denition of two neighboring data
sets.
Denition 2.1 (Neighboring data sets). Two data sets D and D ′ are neighbors (denoted as d(D,D ′) = 1) if they agree
in all except one record.
From that, we have a formal denition of dierential privacy.
Denition 2.2 (Dierential privacy). An algorithmA is ϵ−dierentially private if for any output value x ofA and for
any pair of neighboring data sets D and D ′:
pdf(A(D) = x ) ≤ exp(ϵ) · pdf(A(D ′) = x )
where ϵ is the privacy budget of the algorithm A.
2.2 Discrete-time Survival Analysis
For discrete-time models, let time be divided into intervals [a0,a1), [a1,a2), . . . , [aq−1,aq ],a0 = 0,aq = 1, where q is the
number of discrete times. e discrete time t refers to the interval [at−1,at ). A discrete random variable T represents
the discrete failure time. T = t denotes the failure within the time interval t = [at−1,at ). e characteristic function of
T is the discrete hazard function:
h(t ) = Pr(T = t | T ≥ t ), t = 1, . . . ,q
which is the conditional probability for the risk of failure in interval t given the survival in all previous intervals. e
discrete survival function for reaching interval t is:
S(t ) = Pr(T ≥ t ) =
t−1∏
s=1
(1 − h(s)) (1)
Discrete-time data sets are given by (xi ,δi , ti ), i = 1, . . . ,n, where ti = min(Ti , ci ) is the minimum of the survival
time Ti and censoring time ci , and δi is the indicator variable for failure (δi = 1) or censoring (δi = 0). When δi = 0, the
ith patient is known to survive until time ci but the survival time Ti is not observed (Ti > ci ). xi is a real vector of
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Fig. 1. The illustration of link functions: logit (green), cloglog (blue) and probit (red). We observe that these link functions are very
similar in shape. Notably, the logit link function and cloglog link function are almost identical at x near 0. This explains why the
output models from the logit link function and cloglog link function are very similar in practice when the number of discrete time q is
large, or equivalently, the hazard rate x is small.
explanatory variables (e.g., sex, age, weight, etc.) which aect the survival probability. We assume that xi is inside the
unit-sphere, ‖xi ‖≤ 1. is is actually a common practice in machine learning. Without loss of generality, we assume
that 0 ≤ ti ≤ 1. For convenience, we use yi to refer to the term (2δi − 1) and di to refer to the tuple (xi ,yi , ti ).
3 DISCRETE-TIME REGRESSION MODEL
In this section, we introduce the discrete-time regression models which are used to model the relationship between
explanatory variables and the hazard rate, i.e., the predictive variable. From that, the subsequent sections will discuss
the proposed dierentially private approaches to guarantee that the estimated parameters from the regression model
satisfy the denition of dierential privacy.
3.1 Generalized Linear Models
We model the eects of explanatory variables xi to the survival probability by using a generalized linear model:
д(h(ti | xi )) = γ (ti ) + x ′i β (2)
where д(·) is the link function, β is the parameter vector representing the eects of explanatory variables and γ (ti ) is a
time-varying baseline hazard eect.
A commonly used link function in survival probability is the logit link function д(x ) = loдit (x ) = log
( x
1−x
)
. e logit
link function allows the model to have a nice interpretation of the proportional odds ratio. e other two link functions,
which are also used in survival analysis, are the complementary log-log link functionд(x ) = cloдloд(x ) = log(− log(1−x )),
and the probit link function д(x ) = probit (x ) = Φ−1(x ), where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal distribution. Interestingly, the complementary log-log link function has the same interpretation of proportional
hazard ratio as the Cox regression. We refer interested readers to (Allison 1982) for more details.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the three link functions have similar shapes which lead to similar estimation results. In
this work, we have selected the logit link function because it has a bounded derivative for the loss function which is
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required by our proposed Extended Output Perturbation and Extended Objective Perturbation approaches. However,
our proposed sampling approach can work with all three link functions.
3.2 Baseline Hazard Eect
We model the baseline hazard eect γ (t ) using natural cubic spline (Friedman et al. 2001) with e knots equally distributed
over the interval [0, 1], 0 = k1 < k2 < · · · < ke = 1.
Let
dj (t ) =
max(t − kj , 0)3 −max(t − ke , 0)3
ke − kj
and
b1(t ) = 1,b2(t ) = t ,bi+2 = di (t ) − de−1(t )
e baseline hazard eect γ (t ) is approximated as a linear combination of e basis functions:
γ (t ) = α1b1(t ) + · · · + αebe (t )
In particular, let Ai = [b1(ti ), . . . ,be (ti )]′ and α = [α1, . . . ,αe ]′, then we can write γ (ti ) = α ′Ai .
3.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)
Traditionally, we use MLE to estimate parameters α and β in our models. e aim is to maximize the log-likelihood of
the observed data. For simplicity, let f =
(
α
β
)
and xti =
(
At
xi
)
. e log-likelihood function is:
logL(f ) =
n∑
i=1
log
[
h(ti | f ,xi )δi (1 − h(ti | f ,xi ))1−δi S(ti | f ,xi )
]
Let yi = 2δi − 1, from (1), (2) and substituting д(x ) = loдit (x ), we can rewrite our problem as:
logL(f ) = −
n∑
i=1
[
`LR(yi f ′xtii ) +
ti−1∑
s=1
`LR(−f ′xsi )
]
where `LR(x) = log(1 + exp(−x)) is the logistic loss function. To further simplify the formula, let di = (xi ,yi , ti ), i =
1, . . . ,n, and let
`(f ;di ) = `LR(yi f ′xtii ) +
ti−1∑
s=1
`LR(−f ′xsi ) (3)
be the loss function. en, we get an ERM problem as follows:
f ∗ = arg min
f
n∑
i=1
`(f ;di ) (4)
In this work, our main goal is to propose algorithms which protect dierential privacy for f ∗ in Equation (4).
4 PERTURBATION APPROACHES
4.1 Extended Output Perturbation
In this section, we present our proposed algorithm which is the extension of the Output Perturbation approach in
(Chaudhuri et al. 2011). For our problem, the loss function is a sum of logistic loss functions instead of a single logistic
loss function as in (Chaudhuri et al. 2011). e proposed algorithm is in fact based on the generalized version of the
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Algorithm 1 AExt−Out−Pert: Extended Output Perturbation
Input: Data set D = {d1, . . . ,dn }, loss function `(f ;di ), privacy budget ϵ
Output: fpr iv
1: J (f ;D) = 1n
∑n
i=1 `(f ;di ) +
Λ
2 ‖ f ‖2
2: Minimize J (f ;D) by using the BFGS algorithm to get the non-private solution f ∗
3: Compute t ←
∑q
s=1
√
4+‖As ‖2+maxs∈{1, . . .,q}
√
‖2As ‖2+4
n ·Λ
4: Sample a random vector b such that pdf(b) ∝ exp
(
−ϵ ‖b ‖t
)
5: Compute and output fpr iv ← f ∗ + b
Laplace mechanism (Dwork 2008) which is described as follows: Let f ∗ = G(D) be the value that we want to guarantee
dierential privacy. f ∗ is the result of applying a function G on the private data set D (e.g., it is in our case to minimize
the objective function). We dene the sensitivity of the function G as follows:
sen(G) = max
D,D′
‖G(D) −G(D ′)‖
where D and D ′ are two neighboring data sets. en, the dierentially private version of f ∗ = G(x ) is:
fpr iv = f ∗ + µ
where µ is a noisy random variable with probability density function pdf(µ) ∝ exp(−ϵ ‖µ‖/sen(G)).
As required by the Output Perturbation approach, we consider the following regularized objective function:
J (f ;D) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
`(f ;di ) +
Λ
2 ‖ f ‖
2 (5)
where D = {di }ni=1, `(·) is the loss function as dened in (3) and Λ is the regularization parameter. In this approach, our
goal is to compute the sensitivity of:
f ∗ = arg min
f
J (f ;D)
en, we use the sensitivity to control the amount of noise added to f ∗.
4.1.1 Proposed Algorithm. Algorithm 1 shows the proposed Extended Output Perturbation approach. It returns a
vector fpr iv as the minimizer of J (·) while guaranteeing dierential privacy. At Line 2, we compute the non-private
solution f ∗ = arg minf = J (f ;D) using the well-known BFGS algorithm (Fletcher 2013). f ∗ is guaranteed to exist due
to the strongly convexity of J (f ;D). At Line 3, we compute t which is the sensitivity of f ∗. Lines 4-5 add noise to the
value of f ∗.
In order to sample a random vector b in Algorithm 1 from the distribution pdf(b) ∝ exp (−ϵ ‖b‖/t), we observe that
the length of the vector b follows a Gamma distribution:
‖b‖∼ Γ(d, t/ϵ)
where d is the number of components of b. us, in order to sample b we rst sample its length r = ‖b‖ from the
Gamma distribution and then sample b as a uniform random point on the surface of a sphere with radius r .
4.1.2 Privacy Guarantee. In order to prove the dierential privacy protection, we focus on proving that the sensitivity
of f ∗ at Line 2 in Algorithm 1 is equal to the value of t which is computed at Line 3. Here, we use Lemma 4.1 from
(Chaudhuri et al. 2011) to bound the sensitivity of f ∗.
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Lemma 4.1. Let G(f ) and д(f ) be two vector-valued functions, which are continuous and dierentiable at all points. In
addition, let G(f ) and G(f ) + д(f ) be λ−strongly convex. If f1 = arg minf G(f ) and f2 = arg minf G(f ) + д(f ), then
‖ f1 − f2‖≤ 1
λ
max
f
‖∇д(f )‖
From Lemma 4.1, our goal now is to bound the magnitude of the dierence in the gradients of the objective function
J (·) on any two neighboring data sets.
Lemma 4.2. For any pair of patient’s records di = (xi ,yi , ti ) and dj = (x j ,yj , tj ), and for any f ,
‖∇`(f ;di ) − ∇`(f ;dj )‖≤
q∑
s=1
√
‖As ‖2+4 + max
s ∈{1, ...,q }
√
‖2As ‖2+4
Proof.
∇`(f ;di ) = ∇`LR(yi f ′xtii ) +
ti−1∑
s=1
∇`LR(−f ′xsi )
=
−yixtii
1 + exp(yi f ′xtii )
+
ti−1∑
s=1
xsi
1 + exp(−f ′xsi )
erefore, we can write ∇`(f ;di ) = ∑qs=1 lsi , where
lsi =

x si
1+exp(−f ′x si ) , i f s < ti−yix si
1+exp(yi f ′x si )
, i f s = ti
®0, i f s > ti
Similarly, we can also write ∇`(f ;dj ) = ∑qs=1 lsj . erefore,
∇`(f ;di ) − ∇`(f ;dj ) =
q∑
s=1
lsi − lsj
We have | −yi1+exp(yi f ′x si ) | ≤ 1, ‖xi ‖ ≤ 1, ‖x j ‖ ≤ 1, for any s ∈ {1 . . .q}, we consider four possible cases as follows:
Case 1: if s < ti and s < tj , then
‖lsi − lsj ‖=

(
(e1 − e2)As
e1xi − e2x j
) ≤ √‖As ‖2+(‖xi ‖+‖x j ‖)2
≤
√
‖As ‖2+4
where e1 = 11+exp(−f ′x si ) and e2 =
1
1+exp(−f ′x sj ) .
Case 2: if s > ti or s > tj , then ‖lsi − lsj |≤ max(‖xsi ‖, ‖xsj ‖) ≤
√
‖As ‖2+1 <
√
‖As ‖2+4.
Case 3: if lsi =
−x si
1+exp(f ′x si )
and lsj =
x sj
1+exp(−f ′x sj ) , then
‖lsi − lsj ‖=
−
(
(e1 + e2)As
e1xi + e2x j
) ≤ √‖2As ‖2+4
where e1 = 11+exp(f ′x si ) and e2 =
1
1+exp(−f ′x sj ) .
Case 4: if lsi =
x si
1+exp(−f ′x si ) and l
s
j =
−x sj
1+exp(f ′x sj )
, then ‖lsi − lsj ‖≤
√
‖2As ‖2+4. is case is similar to Case 3.
Manuscript submied to ACM
Dierentially Private Regression for Discrete-Time Survival Analysis 9
We observe that there is at most one value of s, 1 ≤ s ≤ q, belonging to Case 3 or Case 4 in which ‖lsi − lsj ‖≤√
‖2As ‖2+4. erefore, from the triangle inequality:
‖
q∑
s=1
lsi − lsj ‖≤
q∑
s=1
√
‖As ‖2+4 + max
s ∈{1, ...,q }
√
‖2As ‖2+4
erefore, the lemma follows. 
Finally, we can bound the sensitivity of f ∗ = arg minf J (f ;D) by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. e `2−sensitivity of f ∗ = arg minf J (f ;D) is at most
∑q
s=1
√
4+‖As ‖2+maxs∈{1, . . .,q}
√
‖2As ‖2+4
nΛ .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that two neighboring data sets D and D ′ are dierent at nth patient
with (xn ,yn , tn ) ∈ D and (x ′n ,y′n , t ′n ) ∈ D ′.
LetG(f ) = J (f ;D),д(f ) = J (f ;D ′)−J (f ;D) = 1n (`(f ;d ′n )−`(f ;dn )), f1 = arg minf J (f ;D), and f2 = arg minf J (f ;D ′).
Because 12 ‖ f ‖2 is 1−strongly convex,G(f ) = J (f ;D) is Λ−strongly convex andG(f )+д(f ) = J (f ;D ′) is also Λ−strongly
convex. From Lemma 4.2,
‖∇д(f )‖ =
 1n (∇`(f ;d ′n ) − ∇`(f ;dn ))
≤
∑q
s=1
√
4 + ‖As ‖2 + maxs ∈{1, ...,q }
√
‖2As ‖2+4
n
From Lemma 4.1,
‖ f1 − f2‖≤ 1Λ
∑q
s=1
√
4 + ‖As ‖2 + maxs ∈{1, ...,q }
√
‖2As ‖2+4
n
erefore, the lemma follows. 
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 1 is ϵ−dierentially private.
Proof. For any pair of neighboring data sets D and D ′ and for any fpr iv ,
pdf(fpr iv | D)
pdf(fpr iv | D ′) =
pdf(b1)
pdf(b2)
= exp (−ϵ/t (‖b1‖−‖b2‖))
where b1 and b2 are the corresponding noise vectors at Line 4 in Algorithm 1 with respect to the data sets D and D ′.
If f ∗1 (resp., f
∗
2 ) is the solution at Line 2 of Algorithm 1 on the data set D (resp., D ′), then f ∗1 + b1 = f ∗2 + b2 = fpr iv .
From Lemma 4.3 and the triangle inequality:
‖b1‖−‖b2‖≤ ‖b1 − b2‖= ‖ f1 − f2‖≤ t
where t =
∑q
s=1
√
4+‖As ‖2+maxs∈{1, . . .,q}
√
‖2As ‖2+4
n ·Λ . erefore,
pdf(b1)
pdf(b2) ≤ exp(ϵ). us, Algorithm 1 is ϵ−dierentially
private. 
4.2 Extended Objective Perturbation
In this section, we present a solution based on the Objective Perturbation approach proposed in (Chaudhuri et al.
2011). Similarly to the Extended Objective Perturbation approach, we also consider the objective function as described
in Equation (5). In this approach, instead of adding noise to the solution of the optimization problem as the output
perturbation does, it adds noise to the objective function.
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Algorithm 2 AExt−Obj−Pert: Extended Objective Perturbation
Input: Data set D = {d1, . . . ,dn }, objective function J (f ;D), privacy budget ϵ , parameter Λ
Output: f ∗
1: ∆← 0
2: Compute ϵ ′ ← ϵ − 2 ∑qs=1 log (1 + 14√‖As ‖2+1n(Λ+∆) )
3: if ϵ ′ < ϵ/2 then
4: Binary search value of ∆ such that 2 ∑qs=1 log(1 + 14√‖As ‖2+1n(Λ+∆) ) = ϵ/2 and set ϵ ′ ← ϵ/2
5: Compute t ← ∑qs=1 √4 + ‖As ‖2 + maxs ∈{1, ...,q } √‖2As ‖2+4
6: Sample a random vector b such that pdf(b) ∝ exp (−ϵ ′‖b‖/t)
7: f ∗ ← arg minf J (f ;D) + 1n 〈b, f 〉 + 12 ∆‖ f ‖2
8: Output f ∗
4.2.1 Proposed Algorithm. Algorithm 2 shows the solution in pseudo-code. At Line 2, we compute ϵ ′ which is
used to calibrate the magnitude of a random variable b. Here, the regularization parameter is equal to Λ. At Line 3, if
ϵ ′ < ϵ/2, then it indicates that Λ is not large enough. In this case, an additional positive regularization parameter ∆ is
picked to set the value of ϵ ′ equals to ϵ/2 (Line 4). At Line 5, we compute t which is the sensitivity of ∇J (f ;D). Line 6
samples a random vector b using the same method described in Subsection 4.1.1. Lines 7-8 return the solution of the
noisy objective function using the BFGS algorithm.
4.2.2 Privacy Guarantee. In this section, we will prove that the probability density of f ∗ from Algorithm 2 satises
the dierential privacy denition.
Theorem 4.4. Algorithm 2 is ϵ−dierentially private.
Proof. e noisy objective function from Algorithm 2 is:
f ∗ = arg min
f
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(f ;di ) +
1
n
〈b, f 〉 + 12 (Λ + ∆) ‖ f ‖
2
Due to the convexity of `(·), the gradient is zero at the minimal point f ∗, equivalently,
b = −n(Λ + ∆)f ∗ −
n∑
i=1
∇`(f ∗;di )
Due to the strongly convexity of the objective function, there is a bijective (injective and surjective) mapping from
f to b (denoted as f → b). erefore, we can transform the probability density function of random variable f to the
probability density function of random variable b by a multiplication factor of the Jacobian determinant (Billingsley
2008). From that, the probability density ratio in dierential privacy can be rewrien as:
pdf(f | D)
pdf(f | D ′) =
pdf(b | D)
pdf(b ′ | D ′) ·
|det (Jacob (f → b | D)) |−1
|det (Jacob (f → b ′ | D ′)) |−1 (6)
We rst bound the ratio of the Jacobian determinants. Without loss of generality, we assume that the two data sets
D and D ′ are dierent at nth record with dn ∈ D and dn′ ∈ D ′. Let
A = −Jacob(f → b | D) = n(Λ + ∆)I +
n∑
i=1
∇2`(f ∗;di )
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and E = ∇2`(f ∗;dn ) − ∇2`(f ∗;d ′n ), then
|det (Jacob (f → b | D)) |−1
|det (Jacob (f → b ′ | D ′)) |−1 =
|det (A + E)|
|det (A)| = |det (I + A
−1E)|
Moreover, E = ∑qs=1 Esn −∑qs=1 Esn′ where
Esn =

(x sn )(x sn )′
(1+exp(f ′x sn ))(1+exp(−f ′x sn )) , i f s < tn−y2n (x si )(x sn )′
(1+exp(yn f ′x sn ))(1+exp(−yn f ′x sn )) , i f s = tn
0, i f s > tn
Similarly, we can dene Esn′ by replacing n by n
′. From (Seiler and Simon 1975), for any square matrices A and B,
det (I + A + B) ≤ det (I + |A|) · det (I + |B |)
where |A|= (A′A) 12 . Moreover, A−1Esn and A−1Esn′ are symmetric, thus
det (I + A−1E) ≤
q∏
s=1
det (I + A−1Esn ) · det (I + A−1Esn′ )
We now prove that |det (I + A−1Esn ) |≤ 1 + 14√‖As ‖2+1n(Λ+∆) . Because  −y2n(1+exp(yn f ′x sn ))(1+exp(−yn f ′x sn ))  ≤ 14 , and Esn is either a
zero matrix or 1-rank matrix. e only non-zero eigenvalue of Esn if exist satises |λ1(Esn )|≤ 14 ‖xsn ‖≤ 14
√
‖As ‖2+1. As
the objective function is (Λ + ∆)−strongly convex, A is a full-rank matrix with each eigenvalue greater than n(Λ + ∆).
erefore, |det (I + A−1Esn ) |≤ 1 + 14√‖As ‖2+1n(Λ+∆) . Similarly, |det (I + A−1Esn′ )|≤ 1 + 14√‖As ‖2+1n(Λ+∆) . erefore,
|det (Jacob (f → b) | D) |−1
|det (Jacob (f → b ′) | D ′) |−1 ≤ exp
(
2
q∑
s=1
log(1 +
1
4
√
‖As ‖2+1
nΛ )
)
(7)
Next, we bound the ratio of the probability density of random vector b with respect to two neighboring data sets. We
have:
b − b ′ = ∇`(f ∗;dn ) − ∇`(f ∗;d ′n )
From Lemma 4.2,
‖b − b ′‖≤
q∑
s=1
√
‖As ‖2+4 + max
s ∈{1, ...,q }
√
‖2As ‖2+4
erefore,
pdf(b | D)
pdf(b ′ | D ′) ≤ exp(ϵ
′‖b − b ′‖/t ) ≤ exp(ϵ ′) (8)
From (6), (7), (8), and ϵ = ϵ ′ + 2 ∑qs=1 log (1 + 14√‖As ‖2+1nΛ ) , the theorem follows. 
5 PROPOSED SAMPLING APPROACH
In this section, we propose a solution which guarantees dierential privacy by directly sampling a random output from
a modied version of the posterior distribution. In this work, we pick a normal distribution as the prior distribution.
is is equivalent to using:
U(f ;D) = −12σ ‖ f ‖
2−
n∑
i=1
`(f ;di )
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Fig. 2. The illustration of the sanitizer function (blue) with maximum value 20 and the identity function (red).
as the utility function in the exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar 2007) where the parameter σ is used to
control the variance of the prior normal distribution. en, the dierrentially private output is sampled from the
following distribution:
pdf(f ) ∝ exp
(
ϵU(f ;D)
2∆U
)
where ∆U = maxd (D,D′)=1,f ‖U(f ;D) − U(f ;D ′)‖ is the sensitivity of U . e reason we pick a normal prior
distribution instead of a uniform prior distribution is not because our proposed solution required so to guarantee
dierential privacy but we observe that with a normal prior distribution the sampling algorithm converges beer and is
more stable.
Moreover, this approach requires the utility functionU(f ;D) has to have a bounded sensitivity. However, the loss
function `(·) is not bounded. erefore, the functionU(f ;D) has unbounded sensitivity. In order to overcome this
diculty, we propose a smooth sanitizer functionC(x ) which is used to control the maximum value of the loss function
`(·). e denition of C(x ) is given as follows:
Cv (x ) = v · tanh
(x
v
)
which is illustrated in Figure 2. We now take the composition ofCv (·) with `(f ;di ) to have a bounded-sensitivity utility
function:
U(f ;D) = −12σ ‖ f ‖
2−
n∑
i=1
Cv (`(f ;di ))
We intentionally pick the tanh(·) function as the sanitizer because it nicely keeps the loss function in its original
form when the value of the loss function is near 0. Meanwhile, it deforms the loss function at large values to make the
function nite. e advantage of this approach is that the sampled parameter can arbitrary large while the objective
function is kept almost the same around the optimal parameter which maximizes the posterior probability. We describe
the pseudo-code of our approach in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3 ASanitized−EXP: Sanitized Loss Mechanism
Input: Data set D = {di }ni=1, loss function `(f ;di ), privacy budget ϵ , maximum value v , parameter Λ
Output: f
1: U(f ;D) = − 12σ ‖ f ‖2−
∑n
i=1Cv (`(f ;di ))
2: Sample a random vector f with the probability density
pdf(f ) ∝ exp
( ϵ
2vU(f ;D)
)
Theorem 5.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm 3 is ϵ−dierentially private.
Proof. For two neighboring data sets D and D ′,
∆U = maxf ,d (D,D′)=1 |U(f ;D) −U(f ;D ′)|≤ v . erefore, at any point f , we have
pdf(f | D)
pdf(f | D ′) =
exp
( ϵ
2vU(f ;D)
)
/∫ exp( ϵ2v U(f ;D))df
exp
( ϵ
2vU(f ;D ′)
)
/∫ exp( ϵ2v U(f ;D′))df
≤ exp
(
2ϵ
2v
U(f ;D) −U(f ;D ′))
≤ exp(ϵ)
erefore, Algorithm 3 is ϵ−dierentially private. 
e problem with Algorithm 3 is that there is no run-time ecient algorithm to sample the distribution of f exactly.
Bassily et al. (Bassily et al. 2014) proposed a polynomial run-time sampling algorithm. However, their proposed
algorithm is still impractical due to the high degree of the polynomial run-time complexity and only apply for the
log-convex function. Recently, there are developments (Ahn et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2014; Ma et al. 2015) in Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method which can be applied to machine learning problems with large data sets. e idea
is to construct Markov chains to simulate dynamical systems with stochastic gradients. At each step, we compute the
gradient at the current location, then add a controlled amount of noise to the gradient and follow the noisy gradient
to a new location. Asymptotically, the stationary distribution of this process converges to the true distribution from
which the gradient is computed.
In this work, we propose to use an MCMC sampling algorithm, namely Preconditioned Stochastic Gradient Langevin
Dynamics (pSGLD) (Li et al. 2015), to approximately sample the posterior distribution. pSGLD is good at sampling
variables with dierences in scale which is useful for our problem because the parameter α is usually much larger in
magnitude than the parameter β (recall that f = [α , β]′). e pseudo-code of pSGLD is described in Algorithm 4. At
Line 1, we initialize the values ofV0 and f1. Line 3 computes the learning rate ϵt . It is required that limt→∞
∑
t ϵt →∞
and limt→∞
∑
t ϵ
2
t < ∞ to guarantee the convergence. We sample uniformly k records from D for estimating the
average gradient д¯t (Line 5). We then compute the variance of the gradient at Line 6 ( is the element-wise product) and
convert it to the preconditioned matrixGt at Line 7. We update the parameter at Line 8 with a noise variableN (0, ϵtGt ).
It is worth to note that there is a permanent bias in pSGLD due to excluding a correction term in the updating step
(Line 8). However, this bias is negligible and excluding the correction term helps to speed up the sampling algorithm
which then helps to reduce the nite-sample bias as more steps are executed in a nite amount of time.
Manuscript submied to ACM
14 T.T. Nguyeˆn et al.
Algorithm 4 ApSGLD: pSGLD Sampling Algorithm
Input: Data set D = {di }ni=1, loss function `, privacy parameter ϵ , µ, k , bounded value v and learning rate τ
Output: f T +1
1: V0 ← ®0, f1 ← ®0
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Compute ϵt ← t−τ
4: Uniformly sample Ωtk =
{
dt1 , . . . ,dtk
} ⊂ D
5: Compute д¯t = ϵ2v (
σ f t
n +
1
k
∑k
i=1 ∇Cv (`(f t ,dti )))
6: V t ← µV t−1 + (1 − µ)(д¯t  д¯t )
7: Gt ← 1/
(
λI + diaд(
√
V t )
)
8: f t+1 ← f t − ϵt
(
Gt · nд¯t ) +N (0, ϵtGt )
9: Output f T+1
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present the results of our experiments on four real data sets. We focus on answering the following
three important research questions: (1) Does the sampling approach converge to its stationary distribution? (2) What
is the trade-o between privacy and accuracy as compared to the non-private estimation? (3) Are the discrete-time
regression models good alternatives to the Cox regression model? In the following sections, we address the above
research questions accordingly.
6.1 Data Sets
Table 1. Statistics of the data sets.
Data set Size #uncensored #explanatory variables
FL 7874 2169 8
TB 16116 1761 3
WT 21685 18615 3
SB 53558 16341 3
We use four real data sets in our experiments. Table 1 gives the statistics of these data sets.
• e FLchain data set (FL) - It is obtained from a study on the association of the serum free light chain with
higher death rates (Dispenzieri et al. 2012; Kyle et al. 2006). e survival time of a patient is measured in
days from enrollment until death. e censored cases are patients who are still alive at the last contact. e
explanatory variables are age, sex, creatinine, mgus, etc.
• e time-to-second-birth (SB) and time-to-third-birth (TB) data sets - ey are obtained from e Medical Birth
Registry of Norway (Irgens 2000). e survival time is the time between the rst and second births, and between
the second and third births respectively. e censored cases are women who do not have the second birth, and
the third birth respectively, at the time the data are collected. e explanatory variables in SB (resp., TB) are
age, sex and death of earlier children (resp., age, spacing and sibs).
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the probability densities of the sampling posteriors aer 250 epochs at privacy budget ϵ = 6.4.
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Fig. 4. An illustration of MRE as a statistical test for samples from the pSGLD sampling algorithm.
• e Wichert data set (WT) - It contains records on unemployment duration of people in Germany (Wichert and
Wilke 2008). e survival time is the duration of unemployment until having a job again. e censored cases
are the ones who do not have a new job at the time the data are collected. e explanatory variables are sex,
age and wage.
e survival times in these four data sets are normalized to the interval [0, 1]. We set the number of discrete-time
intervals q = 200. All the vectors of the explanatory variables are normalized to have zero mean and ed inside the
unit sphere. We use the natural cubic spline with e = 3 knots to model the baseline hazard eect.
6.2 Convergence of the Proposed Sampling Approach
is section reports on the convergence of our proposed sampling approach. e aim is to check whether it converges
to the stationary distribution. e loss function is bounded by the value v = 2 log(n) where n is the size of the data set.
We set the parameter σ = 10−2 · 2v/ϵ . At each step of the Markov chain, we randomly pick k = 200 records from the
data set to compute the gradient. We set the parameters τ = 0.51, λ = 10−5 and µ = 0.99 in Algorithm 3. In Figure 3, we
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Fig. 5. The performance of our proposed approaches in MRE with privacy budget ϵ from 0.1 to 6.4.
plot the estimated probability densities of the two rst parameters (β (1) and β (2)) aer 250 epochs from the sampling
process. We remove the rst 104 steps as the Markov chain does not reach the stationary distribution at the beginning.
We can observe that the probability densities of the samples are very similar to the normal distributions which are
actually what we expect when sampling from the posterior distributions.
For a more formal test, we use the mean relative error (MRE) as a statistical test of convergence. MRE is dened as
follows:
MRE = 1
t
t∑
i=1
‖ fi − f ∗‖
‖ f ∗‖ (9)
where fi is the parameter vector from the sampling process, f ∗ is the optimal parameter vector which maximizes the
likelihood in non-private seing and t is the number of samples. We plot the MRE as the function of epochs with three
dierent privacy budgets in Figure 4. Each epoch is a bundle of n steps. We observe that aer 250 epochs, MRE becomes
stable which indicates that the sampling procedure converges to its stationary distribution.
6.3 Trade-o between Privacy and Accuracy
Table 2. The performance in MRE of Ext-Out-Pert approach for dierent regularization parameters with privacy budget ϵ = 6.4. The
best performance results are in bold.
Λ 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
FL 981.635 98.135 9.828 1.195 0.837 0.882
TB 90.994 9.113 1.273 0.964 0.975 0.983
WT 342.939 34.297 3.456 0.763 0.765 0.81
SB 9.59 1.224 0.957 0.993 0.998 0.999
In this section, we investigate the trade-o between privacy and accuracy in our proposed approaches. We rst
need to pick the value of regularization terms for the perturbation approaches (Ext-Obj-Pert and Ext-Out-Pert) as the
accuracy of these approaches are very much depend on the regularization parameter Λ. We report in Table 2 the MREs
of Ext-Out-Pert with dierent values of Λ and privacy budget ϵ = 6.4. For consistency in performance comparison, we
will use the best values of Λ, which lead to the smallest relative error per data set.
To measure the accuracy of the proposed approaches at dierent privacy levels, the privacy budget is varied from 0.1
to 6.4. We also use MRE for the measurement. e results are shown in Figure 5. Overall, pSGLD outperforms both
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Ext-Out-Pert and Ext-Obj-Pert approaches. Moreover, we observe that the accuracy of Ext-Out-Pert and Ext-Obj-Pert
does not improve much at high privacy budgets. It is due to the large regularization parameter that causes the output
parameter moving towards the zero vector instead of the optimal parameter as the regularization term is the dominant
factor of the objective function. Meanwhile, our proposed sampling approach (pSGLD) does not suer from this eect
which leads to much beer results at high privacy budgets.
6.4 Comparison with Cox regression
Table 3. Relative error of the discrete-time survival regression as compared to the Cox regression.
Data set Relative error (%)
FL 2.589%
TB 9.039%
WT 3.617%
SB 2.618%
Here, we want to conrm that the discrete-time regression models are good alternatives to the Cox regression model.
We compare the results obtained from the non-private discrete-time regression models without regularization term to
the results obtained from Cox regression. We use the relative error (RE) which is dened as:
RE = ‖β − β
∗‖
‖β∗‖
where β is from the discrete-time regression with logit link and β∗ is from Cox regression. e results are shown in
Table 3. We observe that the results obtained from the discrete-time regressions are very similar to the results obtained
from the Cox regression with relative errors ranging from 2% − 9%. At the worse case of the data set TB, the parameter
obtained from the discrete-time model β = [0.0122443,−0.849823,−0.239539]′ is still a good approximation of the
parameter obtained from the Cox model β∗ = [0.0585478,−0.790977,−0.23906]′. As such, these results conrm that the
discrete-time regression models are good alternatives to the Cox regression in practice.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose solutions for the problem of protecting dierential privacy for discrete-time regression models
used in survival analysis. In particular, we extend the perturbation approaches to a generalized form in which the
loss function is a sum of logistic loss functions. In addition, we propose a sampling approach to practically protect
dierential privacy by sampling a scaled posterior distribution with the pSGLD sampling algorithm. Even though we
focus our work on discrete-time survival regression, our proposed approaches can be applied to other problems with
similar loss functions as well. Moreover, our proposed approaches can be easily extended to discrete-time regression
models in which the explanatory variables are changed over time. For further work, a dierentially private version of
Cox regression would be a good complement to our work.
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